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I. TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
A. DISGORGEMENT OF DEFENDANT'S PROFITS: PROVE IT.
No, YOU PROVE IT
N trademark and copyright cases, a prevailing plaintiff can ordinarily
recover the defendant's profits in addition to whatever damages the
plaintiff can show it has suffered. "In assessing profits [in trademark
cases] the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's sales only; de-
fendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed."' In copy-
right cases, the copyright owner may recover "any profits of the infringer
that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in
computing the actual damages," and "[i]n establishing the infringer's
profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only of the in-
fringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her
deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors
other than the copyrighted work."'2 But what must a prevailing plaintiff
show in order to recover a defendant's profits from misappropriation of
trade secrets?
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit answered this question, ap-
parently for the first time in many decades, in MGE UPS Systems, Inc. v.
GE Consumer and Industrial, Inc.3 Here, the defendant had been found
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006). The plaintiff is only entitled to recover profits attribu-
table to the infringement, but separating those profits from profits attributable to other
factors is the defendant's burden.
2. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006). The court noted that in meeting its initial burden, a
copyright claimant "must show gross revenue reasonably related to the infringement."
MGE UPS Sys. v. GE Consumer & Indus., 622 F.3d 361, 367 (5th Cir. 2010).
3. MGE UPS Sys., 622 F.3d at 361.
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liable for misappropriation of trade secrets involved in using "dongles" to
boot up software. After the plaintiff's damages expert was struck and its
lay witness testimony was found insufficient to support an award of rea-
sonable royalties, the only information left to support an award was a
chart showing the defendant's gross revenues from all its businesses-not
just the one that was involved in the "dongle" matter, and even then not
separating the profits from the expenses.
The court found no support in Texas law for the proposition that dis-
gorgement of profits in trade secret cases would follow the burden-shift-
ing procedure of trademark and copyright disputes. Instead, citing the
1973 Dallas Court of Civil Appeals case Elcor Chemical Corp. v. Agri-
Sul, Inc.,4 the Fifth Circuit held although a defendant's profits are a
proper measure of damages in trade secret cases, the plaintiff must offer
evidence "to show the actual profit made by [defendant]." 5 The plaintiff
failed to meet its burden, because the only evidence left was the chart
showing gross revenue from multiple business lines-and profit, as all
know, is not the same as revenue. As a result, the court held, "MGE
needed to take additional steps to deduct unrelated revenue and costs
from these total figures in order to demonstrate PMI's profits related to
the infringement, [and] MGE failed to do so."'6
The plaintiff argued that comment f to section 45 of the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition now governs Texas law on this point.
Comment f provides that in trade secret matters-as in trademark and
copyright actions-the plaintiff "bears the burden of establishing the de-
fendant's sales," and the defendant bears "the burden of establishing any
portion of the sales not attributable to the trade secret and any expenses
to be deducted in determining net profits."'7
Citing, however, the leading Texas trade secret case of In re Bass,8 the
Fifth Circuit held that "Texas courts have not adopted the RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION in its entirety and
whether § 45's comment f is controlling in Texas courts is still an open
question."9 It also held that "In]either the Texas Supreme Court nor any
of the Texas appellate courts have specifically applied comment f to de-
termine a defendant's profits in a trade secret action," and "[g]iven that
comment f's standard sets a plaintiff's burden of proof for trade secret
damages lower than the standard applied in Elcor, we conclude that the
Texas Supreme Court would not adopt the burden-shifting procedures of
4. Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204, 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
5. MGE UPS Sys., 622 F.3d at 369.
6. Id.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmt. f (1995).
8. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739-40 (Tex. 2003). The Fifth Circuit noted that in In
re Bass, the Texas Supreme Court followed the original RESTATEMENT OF TORTS definition
of trade secrets and factors used to identify them. The burden-shifting provisions of the
later RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION are not included there.




B. PLAINTIFF'S LOST PROFITS: DEFENDANT'S SALES ARE
A POOR PROXY
The "departing employee" case of Glattly v. Air Starter Components,
Inc. is instructive on the evidence required to show a plaintiff's lost prof-
its for trade secret misappropriation. Here, the court held that "there is
not 'one complete calculation' that is based on objective data showing
with reasonable certainty [plaintiff's] lost profits due to the misappropria-
tion of its drawings,"" as it held was required under the Texas Supreme
Court case of ERI Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Swinnea.12
The plaintiff appears to have used the defendant's sales as a proxy for
what it would have sold, and hence what it would have made. The plain-
tiff assumed and argued that it would have made all of the sales the de-
fendant had made, including sales for products or services which the
plaintiff did not provide, and even to customers which had ceased buying
from plaintiff for reasons unrelated to the defendant (rather than assum-
ing it would have made about as many of those sales as its market share
reflected for instance). In addition, the plaintiff based its lost profits on
an average of all of its business, not just the profit associated with the
customers or products at issue here. And it appears that the plaintiff
combined its calculations for lost profits due to tortious interference
(which the jury did not find) and for lost profits due to misappropriation
into one amount, without separating them.13
For all these reasons, the court concluded that there was insufficient
evidence on which to support an award of lost profits for trade secret
misappropriation.' 4
C. DURATION OF INJUNCTION: FOREVER AND A DAY
Since the Hyde Corp. v. Huffines and K&G Tool & Service Co. cases
from 1958, it has been understood that in Texas, further misappropriation
of trade secrets may be enjoined "permanently" (meaning "forever")-
even after a patent has expired or the secrets have otherwise been made
10. Id.; see Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204, 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11. Glattly v. Air Starte Components, Inc., 332 S.W.3d 620, 635 (Tex. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 2010, pet. filed).
12. ERI Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 878-79 (Tex. 2010) (plain-
tiff has "burden of providing evidence showing a single complete calculation of lost
profits").
13. Glattly, 332 S.W.3d at 636.
14. Id. at 626. From this reporting period, see also Rusty's Weigh Scales & Serv., Inc.
v. N. Tex. Scales, Inc. 314 S.W.3d 105,110-12 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2010, no pet. h.) (specu-
lation of $2 million lost profits unsupported by objective data; out-of-pocket expenses were
due to the actions of a third party which had settled out; remaining conduct may have been
"unethical," but was not "malicious" as needed to support exemplary damages).
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public-depending on the facts of the particular case.15
Compare this doctrine with the practice of states which limit "the dura-
tion of injunctive relief to the period it would take a legitimate competi-
tor to acquire the information by lawful means" (the "head start"
doctrine). Though the distinction is by no means precise, the latter prac-
tice is often characteristic of states which have adopted the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, which may emphasize the public's interest in not re-
stricting competition any more or longer than necessary. Texas courts
expressly permit injunctions that forever bar a particular defendant from
using the materials in question-even long after all its competitors know
these secrets and even longer than needed to deprive the defendant of
any unfair benefit of its poaching. This practice tends to be characteristic
of states whose trade secret law follows the Restatement of Torts, the the-
ory being that it is the breach of trust or improper means of discovery
which are being remedied, and the court should do more than merely
take away the defendant's unfair "head start." If the worst that would
happen would be to be placed in the same position it would be in other-
wise, no would-be defendant would be deterred from giving trade-secret
misappropriation a try.
The emphasis, however, should be on "may," since whether an injunc-
tion should issue-and if so what its proper scope and duration should
be-is heavily dependent on the facts and equities of the case. That an
injunction to bar a defendant forever may issue does not necessarily
mean it should, and because the injunction will necessarily restrict com-
petition in the field to some degree, there is much to be said for limiting it
carefully to a scope and duration that effectively balances the interests of
owner, poacher, and public. That may mean "forever," but forever, espe-
cially in the digital age, is a long time.
Thus, the result in Glattly, is startling: the Houston First District Court
of Appeals actually reversed a trial court ruling that enjoined a trade se-
cret misappropriator for only thirty years and removed that time period
from the injunction. 16 There the defendants had been found liable for
stealing some drawings. The plaintiff argued that by "only" enjoining the
defendants for thirty years, the court had essentially given the defendants
title to what was in effect stolen property, at the end of that period. The
defendants replied that the prohibition did not do any more than the law
already does in prohibiting a party from using someone else's trade
secrets, and acknowledged that "prohibition exists even without the in-
junction and will continue to exist thirty years from now."'17
Perhaps it was the fact that the case had been characterized as a theft
case or perhaps that the defendants seemed not to assert that someday
15. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 776 (Tex. 1958) (defendant has the bur-
den of persuading the court that the injunction should be less than perpetual); K&G Oil
Tool & Serv. Co. v. G&G Fishing Tool Serv., 314 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. 1958). Compare RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44 cmt. f (1955) and cases collected there.
16. Glattly, 332 S.W.3d, at 642-43.
17. Id. at 643.
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they might be able to use the drawings at issue; or perhaps it was a combi-
nation of this and more. In any event, noting simply that the Texas Su-
preme Court "has affirmed a permanent injunction to prevent the
improper use of trade secrets" and that the defendants "acknowledge
they are prohibited from ever using [the plaintiff's] drawings," the court
concluded that the "trial court erred by limiting the injunction to 30
years."18
II. TEXAS THEFT LIABILITY ACT
A. No DAMAGES: WINNING AND LOSING AT THE SAME TIME
The Texas Theft Liability Act establishes a civil cause of action for theft
under the Texas Penal Code, including unlawfully appropriating a trade
secret.19 "A person who has sustained damages may recover the amount
of those actual damages,20 and a "person who prevails" shall be awarded
costs and attorneys' fees. 21
In Glattly22 the jury found that the defendant violated the Texas Theft
Liability Act and, in effect, stole the drawings at issue. But the jury an-
swered "Zero" on the damages question. 23 In these circumstances, did
the plaintiff "prevail," so as to be entitled to recover its attorneys' fees?
Following the Texas Supreme Court case of International Group Part-
nership v. KB Home Lone Star L.P.,24 the court of appeals answered
"no. ' 25 In that contract action, the Texas Supreme Court had "held that
a party that did not receive damages or other relief on its claim could not
be a prevailing party. '2 6 True, in this case the plaintiff did receive injunc-
tive relief-but the Texas Theft Liability Act does not provide for injunc-
tive relief, only actual damages.27 The injunctive relief was issued from
its common law claim of trade secret misappropriation, not the Theft Lia-
bility Act that would give rise to the attorney's fee award, and conse-
quently the plaintiff was not a "prevailing party" under the Theft Liability
Act.28
B. ACTUAL DAMAGES
Southwest Grain Company, Inc. v. Pilgrim's Pride S.A. de C. V.
presented an interesting stack of factors leading to "actual damages"
18. Id.
19. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 134.001, 134.002(2) (West 2005).
20. Id. § 134.005(a)(1).
21. Id. § 134.005(b).
22. Glattly, 332 S.W.3d at 629-30.
23. Id. at 630.
24. Int'l Grp. P'ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650, 654-55 (Tex. 2009).
25. Glattly, 332 S.W.3d at 641.
26. Int'l Grp. P'ship, 295 S.W.3d at 655-56.




under the Texas Theft Liability Act.2 9 Here, Pilgrim's Pride bought ten
railcars' worth of grain from the defendants and rented the railcars to
transport them.30 The defendants loaded the railcars with the grain, but
when Pilgrim's Pride inspected the grain it found the grain was contami-
nated and refused to pay for it.31 Meanwhile, the railcars sat idle while
Pilgrim's Pride continued to pay the rentals.32 When the case was finally
tried (literally ten years later), the jury found the defendants liable for
conversion and violation of the Texas Theft Liability Act.33 Pilgrim's
Pride elected to recover damages for civil theft under the Act.34
Here, the "actual damages" were held to be (speaking chronologically)
first, the many lease payments that Pilgrim's Pride had paid for the rail-
cars as they sat idle.35 Second, some years into those lease payments and
with no end to them in sight, Pilgrim's Pride actually bought the rail-
cars-a somewhat expensive proposition but at least it cut off the remain-
ing lease payments. Finally there was the "lost use" of the railcars, as
now owning them, Pilgrim's Pride could have at least leased the railcars
to somebody else for what it had been leasing them, but under the cir-
cumstances could not.36 The court held that the expert report "provided
some evidence that Pilgrim's Pride's decision to purchase the railcars was
a 'natural and proximate result' of [the defendant's] violation of the Act,"
and that the damages could include both the cost of buying the railcars
and the lost rental value.37
III. FALSE ADVERTISING
A. ARE CEASE-AND-DESIST LETTERS "ADVERTISING
OR PROMOTION?"
Cease-and-desist letters, and related allegations in the field to the ef-
fect that one competitor is behaving in an untoward manner, are often
infuriating to their targets and are common subjects of litigation. This
was the situation in Transcom Enhanced Services, Inc. v. Qwest Corp.,
where the issue was whether the defendant's purported "allegations in
the telecom industry" that the plaintiff was "masking toll calls and other-
wise avoiding paying access charges through fraudulent conduct" would
29. Sw. Grain Co., Inc. v. Pilgrim's Pride, No. 13-07-00557-CV, 2010 WL 2638483, at






35. Id. at *4.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *4-5. Significantly, the twelve years between the events giving rise to the




be actionable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.38
The court stated that, by its terms, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
requires a party alleging a false or misleading statement of fact about his
own or another party's goods or services show that it was done "in the
context of 'commercial advertising or promotion."' 39 Typically, cease-
and-desist letters are directed to a competitor insisting that the competi-
tor stop something it is doing, while the sorts of aspersions that the letter-
writer's sales force often tells would-be customers are efforts to dissuade
persons from buying the target competitor's products. So, are these ef-
forts to suppress a competitor's sales conducted "in the context of 'com-
mercial advertising or promotion"'?
The Fifth Circuit has held that "for a statement to constitute 'commer-
cial advertising or promotion,' the statement must be (1) commercial
speech, (2) by a defendant in commercial competition with the plaintiff,
(3) 'for the purpose of influencing consumers to buy defendant's goods or
services,' and (4) sufficiently disseminated to the relevant purchasing
public to constitute 'advertising' or 'promotion' within the relevant
industry. "40
Here, the court found no allegations that any of the challenged state-
ments were "for the purpose of influencing customers to buy defendant's
goods or services. '4 1 The defendant urged that the letters and associated
communications were for the purpose of enforcing its legal rights, not
persuading listeners to buy from the defendant.4 2 It argued that section
43(a) requires the communications to have contained a "marketing or
sales pitch," citing two district court cases from out of state, in response
to which the plaintiff noted that the Fifth Circuit has never adopted any
such "marketing or sales pitch" requirement. 43 The court declined to de-
cide whether or not the Fifth Circuit "would specifically require a 'mar-
keting or sales pitch,"' but concluded the plaintiff had not met its burden
38. Transcom Enhanced Servs., Inc. v. Qwest Corp., No. 4:09-CV-755-A, 2010 WL
2505606, at *2-4 (N.D. Tex. June 18, 2010). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act of 1946, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006) provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with goods or services... uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which- . . . (B) in com-
mercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, ser-
vices, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
39. Id. at *4.
40. Id. (citing Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1384 (5th Cir. 1996) (em-
phasis added)).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Futuristic Fences, Inc. v. Illusion Fence Corp., 558 F. Supp. 2d 1270,
1280-82 (S.D. Fla. 2008) and Avery Dennison Corp. v. Acco Brands, Inc., No. CV99-
1877DT (MCX), 2000 WL 986995 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2000) ("cease-and-desist letters [...]
were for the purpose of enforcing defendants' legal rights, rather than for the use of [...1
influencing the [addressees] to purchase defendants' goods or services")).
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of showing how any of the defendant's communications were "made to
persuade any consumer to purchase defendant's goods or services."
44
The difference between "enforcing [one's] legal rights" and influencing
consumers to buy one's own goods and services seems ill-defined. 45 En-
forcing one's own legal rights, at least in the cease-and-desist context,
often involves suppressing (presumably unfair or improper) sales efforts
of another. One might also suppose that suppression to lead to enhanced
or improved sales for the writer-or why else would the writer do it-and
so there may be more to the Transcom plaintiff's point (that the Fifth
Circuit has never required a "sales or marketing pitch") than was real-
ized. Without such a requirement, courts may be free to recognize that
even negatively-phrased communications may be made for the purpose of
inducing consumers to buy the defendant's goods and services. Indeed,
though at first glance Transcom seems to suggest otherwise, by basing its
ultimate conclusion on the fact that the plaintiff had not met its burden of
showing how the accused communications were in furtherance of the de-
fendant's own sales efforts the court seems to have left the door open for
future plaintiffs to show in the pleadings exactly (or at least more clearly
than could be shown in Transcom) how that connection is made.
B. KEYWORD ADVERTISING: THE LOG IN YOUR OWN EYE
College Network, Inc. v. Moore Educational Publishers, Inc. offers a
lesson to plaintiffs to first check the skeletons in their own closets before
filing suit against a competitor. 46 Moore "had purchased the phrase 'The
College Network' from Google and Yahoo as a search-engine keyword to
summon MEP's sponsored-link advertising. ' 47 "The College Network,"
however, was a valid trademark owned by the plaintiff and the plaintiff
sued for trademark infringement.48 In one of the first jury verdicts in
Texas on keyword advertising, the jury found that this example of com-
petitive keyword advertising did not constitute trademark infringement,
and the Fifth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff's trademark
claims.49
Before the jury verdict was rendered, the trial court ruled that Moore's
use of the keyword phrase did not constitute trademark "use" in com-
merce, so the jury's verdict that the advertiser did not infringe the trade-
mark may have been based on that ruling as opposed to a finding of no
likelihood of confusion.50 On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit appar-
ently assumed the verdict was based on the latter and held that "the evi-
44. Id. at *5.
45. Id. at *4.
46. Coll. Network, Inc. v. Moore Educ. Publishers Inc., No. 09-50596, 2010 WL
1923763, at *7 (5th Cir. May 12, 2010).
47. Id. at *3.
48. Id. at *1.
49. Id. at *1-2.
50. Id. at *10.
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dence does not compel a finding of likelihood of confusion"51 as it
rejected many of the trademark owner's arguments on procedural
grounds, explaining that "the jury was permitted to view the keyword-
search process and visually compare the companies' websites. ' 52 "[Plain-
tiff's] own expert testified as to lack of actual confusion. '53 "The evi-
dence does not point so 'strongly and overwhelmingly in favor' of
[Plaintiff] that a reasonable jury could not arrive at a contrary verdict. '54
Compounding the plaintiff's loss, the Fifth Circuit mostly affirmed the
district court's judgment in favor of defendant Moore on its counter-
claim, determining that the Plaintiff was liable to Moore (and its princi-
pal) for some $700,000 for defamation.5 5 Apparently, College Network,
Inc. had proclaimed to Moore's customers that Moore was "out of busi-
ness" or "going out of business," and that Moore's principal was a "thief"
and "stole things" from it.56 The jury found both statements were "de-
famatory in nature" and those about Moore's principal were "defamatory
per se."'57 Specific evidence linked the defamatory statements to injury to
Moore and its principal's reputations, including deposition testimony re-
vealing that customers had declined to purchase from Moore because of
the perception the company was going out of business, and the state-
ments correlated with a downward trend in sales. 58 The sales figures also
warranted the jury's award of lost profits.59
C. REVERSE DOMAIN-NAME HIJACKING: THE LOG IN YOUR
OWN EYE, PART II
GoForlt Entertainment, LLC, owns the registered mark "GoForlt" for
use in connection with various services. After it filed suit against several
businesses and an individual claiming cyberpiracy under the Anti-Cyber-
squatting Protection Act (ACPA), false designations of origin under sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and unfair competition, it found itself on
trial for "reverse domain name hijacking. '60
The plaintiff, owner of GoForlt.com, argued that the defendants' use of
sub-domains such as GoForIt.com.org, coupled with wildcard technology
(the automatic insertion of "www." and ".com" before and after a word
in an address bar), infringed on their trademark GoForIt.61 In other
words, a consumer who types in "GoForlt.com" might be redirected to
goforit.com.com. It argued that this combination of sub-domains and
51. Id.
52. Id. at *11 n.5.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at *11.
56. Id. at *1.
57. Id. at *5.
58. Id. at *6.
59. Id.





wildcard technology was done by the defendants specifically to redirect
traffic from the plaintiff's website to their own.62 In response to this al-
leged conduct, the plaintiff directed the registrar of many of the defend-
ants' domain names to place a registration lock on the domains, which
prevented them from changing the names or selling them.63 At the time
of the lock, the defendants alleged "they were negotiating the sale of
some of the [flocked [d]omain [n]ames."'64
In moving for summary judgment, the defendants effectively argued
that the ACPA does not apply to sub-domains, and the court, finding
scant case or statutory authority on the matter, side-stepped the direct
issue of whether the defendants' registrations of sub-domains was done in
bad faith to divert web traffic from registered mark.65 Plaintiff also
claimed the defendants violated section 43(a) by allowing "goforit" to be
used as a third level domain to "com.org," especially because "goforit"
remained visible in the browser's address bar as long as a user remained
on the site, and that such displays resulted in user confusion as to whether
the website displayed is affiliated with the GOFORIT brand.66 Both of
these claims were dismissed, however, due to lack of injury.67 The court
held there was no evidence that plaintiff was damaged by the defendants'
conduct or that any of the defendants' alleged deceptions was likely to
influence purchasing decisions.68
The defendants had also filed counterclaims that the plaintiff's direc-
tion to the registrars to lock their domains was overbroad and constituted
reverse domain-name hijacking.69 The court denied plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment to dismiss these claims, and instead ruled that the
seizure of all the defendants' sub-domains (note, crucially, just the sub-
domains pertaining to their mark, "GoForlt") was indeed overbroad, and
could therefore open them to liability for reverse domain name
hijacking.70
IV. PERSONAL DEFAMATION AND COMMERCIAL
DISPARAGEMENT
A. LINKS TO A BLOG PUBLISHING DEFAMATION
It is well understood that disparaging statements may be defamatory
even if the target is not named in the statement, if people who know the
62. Id. at 718.
63. Id. at 720.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 722-23.
66. Id. at 719-20.
67. Id. at 730.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 720-21.
70. Id. at 737.
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target would understand that the statement refers to him or her.71 Wal-
lace v. Perry makes clear this is also true when the statements are made
indirectly or anonymously, as by including links to websites where the
defamatory statements are found.72
Wallace arose as an adversary proceeding in the defendant's bank-
ruptcy case. The claimants were seeking a range of damages for defama-
tion (among numerous other claims), and objecting to Perry's discharge
on grounds he had committed the acts with malice. 73 Among the claims
was that Perry had insinuated that Wallace was not only an international
arms dealer, but had been involved with Mark Thatcher (son of former
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher) in an effort to overthrow the govern-
ment of Equatorial Guinea.74 Apparently Perry asked his assistant to dis-
tribute some anonymous emails containing a link to a third-party blog
where these allegations were found.75 The bankruptcy court (which held
that Perry's hands were not only "unclean" but "filthy" for equitable pur-
poses) 76 had no trouble concluding that Perry defamed Wallace when he
published the link to the blog.7 7 The court further found and concluded
that the allegations and insinuations were false.78
B. NOT DEFAMATORY TO ACCUSE SOMEONE OF A LAWFUL ACT
Means v. ABCABCO, Inc. presented an interesting defamation case in
an odd context. 79 The City of Austin was considering granting a fourth
taxicab franchise. Kassa worked as a taxicab driver for one of the incum-
bents, Austin Cab, but formed his own cab company and set to work try-
ing to gain the fourth Austin franchise. 80 Austin Cab terminated Kassa's
contract, ostensibly because of his failure to comply with various terms,
but Kassa believed the real reason was because he had formed his own
taxicab company and was trying to gain a franchise to compete with it.81
And so hp, or his lawyer, informed the Austin City Council. 82 Days after
making those comments, Austin Cab sued Kassa for defamation among
other claims. 83
71. Wallace v. Perry, 423 B.R. 215, 267-68 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (citing Ledig v.
Duke Energy Corp., 193 S.W.3d 167, 180 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)
and Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, 339 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. 1960)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 230.
74. Id. at 241.
75. Id. at 248.
76. Id. at 287.
77. Id. at 269.
78. Id. at 232-33, 241.
79. Means v. ABCABCO, Inc., 315 S.W.3d 209, 209 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, no pet.
h.).
80. Id. at 211.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. It is highly questionable whether the claim should have been pled as one of
personal defamation as opposed to one of commercial disparagement. Commercial dispar-
agement would seem more appropriate as it was Austin Cab whose business reputation was
[Vol. 64
Business Torts
Interestingly, the court held that Kassa's statements were not defama-
tory at all.84 Clearly, the cab driver was saying that Austin Cab termi-
nated his contract as soon as it found out he was seeking a franchise that
would compete with it, but "[tihis statement," held the court, "does not
suggest some wrongful or unethical conduct by Austin Cab."'85 It merely
says that "Austin Cab terminated its contract with Kassa because was
supporting a competitor. ' 86 The court went on to say "the ability to ter-
minate a contract is a legal and ethical option often available to parties to
a contract," and the suggestion that the firing was "retaliation for Kassa's
support of a competitor does not make the statement defamatory.
87
Austin Cab had a legal right to terminate Kassa's contract, Kassa's state-
ment "did nothing more than accuse [Austin Cab] of doing that which it
had a legal right to do,"' 88 and crucially, statements which, though insult-
ing or offensive, simply accuse a plaintiff of doing something the plaintiff
had a right to do are not defamatory as a matter of law.89
C. BUSINESS DISPARAGEMENT: HONESTLY
In Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata, the plaintiff alleged
that a competing engineering firm made disparaging statements about it
in two emails to third parties. 90 One email said the defendants and sev-
eral other "engineers left their 'old companies' to 'create a smaller, hon-
est, cost effective alternative for the insurance claims industry [that would
be responsive and cost-effective]."'91 The other email claimed, "We have
never been a target of the media, the plaintiff's bar, or investigated by a
government entity."'92 The plaintiff complained that these constituted
disparagement in suggesting that the plaintiff-though not mentioned by
name-was not "honest," had done something wrong in the wake of Hur-
ricane Katrina, or both.93
Many competitors see others' affirmative claims (i.e., "we are honest")
as thinly-disguised assaults on themselves ("as compared to some busi-
nesses we could mention"). But this is a highly contextual argument to
make and it is much easier to imagine than to prove. Here, it was unper-
suasive because the emails referred to "three different engineering
firms," not just the plaintiff, and the context showed the statements were
intended to showcase the differences between the defendant firm and
at issue as opposed to the personal reputation of an individual. See Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl.
Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1987).
84. Means, 315 S.W.3d at 211.




89. Id.; cf ACS Investors, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1997) (not tortious
interference to persuade a person to do something he has a right to do).







these much larger firms-leaving "no basis to conclude" that a reader
would take the statements as pointing to the plaintiff and no one else.94
Further, and in any event, there was no record of special damages arising
from the statements.95
Thus Rimkus are reminders of the difficulty in alleging and proving
business disparagement in Texas, which still requires proof of falsity, mal-
ice, and special damages, and of the difficulty of sustaining an action
based on a competitor's claim that it is "honest."'96
V. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON "LACK OF INTENT": NOT LIKELY
Tortious interference requires proof that the defendant willfully and
intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's contract. 97 Can summary
judgment be granted in a tortious interference case if the defendant as-
serts he simply did not know of the contract or did not believe he was
interfering? Rule 166a(c) suggests it may be if the defendant's assertion
may be "readily controverted." 98 But Wohlstein v. Aliezer reminds that
"summary judgment should generally not be granted as to issues of
knowledge or intent because the non-movant cannot readily controvert a
defendant's self-serving denials." 99
B. PROOF OF LOST PROFITS: Focus ON THE LOST CUSTOMERS
A substantial award of lost profits in a tortious-interference case was
reversed by the Dallas Court of Appeals in Exel Transportation Services,
Inc. v. Aim High Logistics Services, LLC. 100 Plaintiff Aim High claimed
Exel circumvented the procedures in their agreement in order to "'steal
[four of Aim High's] customers,"' namely Yamaha, Del Monte, Funai,
and Electrolux. 10 1 The appellate court found no record evidence of any
wrongdoing apart from these four accounts, but Aim High's damages
models only calculated "company-wide" lost profits and did not "individ-
ually price tag" the losses with respect to just these four.'0 2
94. Id. at 671-72.
95. Id. at 672.
96. Hurlbut v. Gulf Atd. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex. 1987). See also Nat'l.
Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1927), cert. denied
275 U.S. 570 (1927) (pamphlet urged the benefits of White Rose gasoline, said gas made
with Benzol was harmful, and urged consumers to buy White Rose, "an honestly made
gasoline"; court held special damages must be shown).
97. See Batnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 207 (Tex. 2002).
98. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
99. Wohlstein v. Aliezer, 321 S.W.3d 765, 772 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010,
no pet. h.). The court noted, however, that English was not the appellant's native lan-
guage, and the clarity of the movant's affidavit contrasted with the movant's deposition
testimony may have contributed to the court's view of his credibility being weighed in
person.
100. Excel Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Aim High Logistics Servs., LLC, 323 S.W.3d 224, 235
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. denied).
101. Id. at 227.
102. Id. at 230, 233-34.
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The "company-wide" damages models may have based on widespread
disruption beyond these four accounts that Aim High claimed to have
suffered when these accounts were removed. 10 3 Evidently these could not
well be quantified, however, and there was also compelling evidence that
the losses attributable to these four accounts were much lower than the
"company-wide" losses, because the loss of just one other very large ac-
count which Exel had not had anything to do with had dropped Aim
High's annual revenue by two-thirds.10n On this record the court con-
cluded that the "company-wide" lost profits did not "relate" to the losses
resulting from the acts alleged, and reversed the award.10 5
C. INTERFERENCE PEHAPS BUT No CAUSATION
Plaintiff Hambric Sports represented professional golfer Anthony Kim
and secured lucrative contracts for him including one with Nike, before
Kim terminated the representation and signed with the IMG agency.106
Hambric alleged that Kim's head had been turned by defendant Gaylord
who wished to represent him.10 7
Gaylord knew of Hambric's exclusive contractual relationship with
Kim, but nevertheless engaged in talks to feel out the market for new
potential endorsement contracts. 0 8 In the court's view, this was suffi-
cient to constitute intentional and willful interference. 10 9 In the end,
Gaylord did not get the job.1 0 But could his efforts have nevertheless
"caused" the alleged breach?
Hambric argued that Gaylord played an active role in persuading Kim
to cancel the agreement because he participated in over thirty phone calls
to discuss replacing Hambric with himself. But Gaylord never succeeded
in the other half of what he allegedly sought-namely, gaining the con-
tract for himself. It was this second half of the equation that the court
focused on, reasoning that it was "necessary that there be some act of
interference or of persuading a party to breach, for example by offering
better terms or other incentives" and, in any event, that there was "no
103. Id. at 229 ("it's huge ... when you have carriers moving in directions for you and
you start pulling accounts out ... it starts damaging everything you put into place.").
104. Id.
105. Id. at 234. The court also distinguished cases holding only objective facts, figures,
or data from which lost profits can be ascertained are required instead of a particular "cus-
tomer identification" formula for proving lost profits. The court observed that one of
those cases (unlike this one) completely prevented the plaintiffs business from operating.
Id. at 233 (citing Ishin Speed Sport, Inc. v. Rutherford, 933 S.W.2d 343, 350-51 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ). The other included testimony of the average price of its
products and average profit margin across many sales, which this case did not. Id. (citing
Sw. Recreational Indus. v. FieldTurf, Inc., No. 01-50073, 2002 WL 32783971, at *4-5 (5th
Cir. Aug. 13, 2002).
106. Hambric Sports Mgmt., LLC v. Team AK, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-1662-L, 2010 WL
2605243, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 29, 2010).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *8.
110. Id. at *2.
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indication in the pleadings that Gaylord actively persuaded Kim to termi-
nate the Agreement." '111 Hence the court found no proximate cause1 12
D. INDEPENDENTLY TORTIOUS OR UNLAWFUL: Two TORTS FOR THE
PRICE OF ONE
Silver Lion, Inc. v. Dolphin Street, Inc. presented an interesting look at
what constitutes an interference that is "independently tortious or other-
wise unlawful" as required to support tortious interference with prospec-
tive contracts or favorable business relationships. 11 3 Here, a landlord had
leased space to a tenant for a nightclub.114 Almost immediately the
nightclub ran into trouble, and it and the landlord entered into an agree-
ment for the landlord to manage the club while the tenant tried to sell it
as an ongoing business.115 The tenant found a prospective buyer, but it
turned out the tenant had downplayed the expenses the landlord would
have to pay while it was keeping the club open, and the landlord refused
to approve the sale unless the buyer paid those expenses and rent for the
three months it had been managing the club.116 When the buyer backed
out, the tenant claimed the landlord had tortiously interfered with its pro-
spective sale.117
The problem here was that under the terms of the management agree-
ment, the landlord did not have a right to make this demand of the pro-
spective buyer. 118 Its agreement with the tenant provided that the
landlord would forgive (or pay itself) the three months of rent-sufficient
evidence, in the court's view, that these statements to the prospective
buyer were fraudulent misrepresentations, not unactionable representa-
tions as to "a point of law or the legal effect of a document." Rather the
statements were "positive assertions of material fact" regarding the ten-
ant's total liabilities, and hence squarely within the example set forth in
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges of how fraudulent statements can support
a claim for tortious interference with a prospective contract.11 9 The ap-
pellate court went on to defer to the trial court's decision (as fact-finder)
to credit the plaintiff's testimony over the buyer's in finding actual causa-
tion, and rejected the defendant's claim that there was undisputed evi-
dence that it wanted the prospective sale to close, finding evidence it only
111. Id. at *9.
112. Id. To some degree, this seems internally inconsistent. If the thirty phone calls
were acts of interference, and all that is required is "persuading a party to breach," and the
party does (allegedly) breach, might interference not follow whether the alleged interferor
benefits from it or not?
113. Silver Lion, Inc. v. Dolphin St., Inc., No. 01-07-00370-CV, 2010 WL 2025749, at *5
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 20, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
114. Id. at *1.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *2.
117. Id. at *3. Months afterward, the buyer did open its own nightclub in the space,
though only after negotiating an entirely new contract with the landlord. Id.
118. Id. at *7.




wanted the sale if it included the payments the landlord was (fraudu-
lently) claiming were required.120
There appears to have been considerable emphasis on the fraudulent
nature of the defendant's statements to the prospective buyer and consid-
erable suspicion of fraudulent intent. One may wonder what would have
been the outcome if the statements had been less fraudulent: mere negli-
gent misrepresentations might well have been "independently tortious or
otherwise unlawful" under Wal-Mart, but would entirely innocent state-
ments, though eventually mistaken, have also amounted to an actionable
interference?
E. THE AT-WILL DILEMMA
In Texas, will a cause of action lie for tortious interference with a con-
tract terminable at will? The 1989 Texas Supreme Court case of Sterner v.
Marathon Oil Co. certainly said "yes," as do a number of subsequent
cases including Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Associates, Inc. and
Knox v. Taylor.121 Yet, this principle sits somewhat uneasily among to-
day's precedents, because the supreme court 1997 case of ACS Investors,
Inc. v. McLaughlin also made clear that merely inducing a party "to do
what it ha[s] a right to do" under a contract-including, assuming the
contract so provides, terminate it-does not constitute tortious
interference.122
This was an issue in Faucette v. Chantos.123 Faucette and other employ-
ees declined to exercise an option to buy out their employer Chantos;
instead, they formed their own company and resigned from Chantos' em-
ployment, and got some of their former employer's lines of business.1
24
Their former employer claimed they intentionally destroyed the business
for their own gain by persuading a manufacturer who had used Chantos
for twenty years to leave, and timing their departure without notice when
its owner was out of state and unable to respond quickly to customers.12
5
Interestingly, the court noted that Juliette Fowler and Sterner provided
causes of action for interference with at-will contracts, but did not ad-
dress the issue square-on; instead it observed that these cases' "protec-
tion" for such cases is "somewhat limited. 1 26 The court went on to find
that the defendants had not actually induced the manufacturer to breach
its contract with Chantos, as its contract had always allowed for termina-
120. Id. at *9-11. In part, this appears to have been because by the time of trial, the
defendant was now the buyer's landlord.
121. Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660, 666 (Tex. 1990)
("[u]ntil a contract is terminated, it is valid and subsisting, and third persons are not free to
tortiously interfere with it"); Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. 1989);
Knox v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 40, 57-58 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.).
122. ACS Investors, Inc. v. McLaughlin943 S.W.2d 426, 431 (Tex. 1997).
123. Faucette v. Chantos, 322 S.W.3d 901,904 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no
pet.).
124. Id. at 905.
125. Id. at 913.
126. Id. at 914.
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tion on notice. 127 Instead, the court characterized plaintiff Chantos'
claim as one of tortious interference with prospective contract, and found
no assertion that the defendants had committed an "independently tor-
tious or otherwise unlawful" act sufficient to support such a claim.12 8
Chantos may have particular interest for employees contemplating a
move or employers about to be offended by one. The Chantos plaintiff
made the point-quite correctly-that a defendant may be liable for in-
terference through actions which make the plaintiff unable to perform
the plaintiff's own contract, destroy or damage property that is the sub-
ject matter of a contract, or make its performance "more burdensome,
difficult or impossible, or of less or no value to the one entitled to per-
formance. ' 129 The Chantos defendants may have done this (or something
very nearly like it) by calculating to a very fine degree the timing and
mechanics of their abrupt departure. However, note the difference be-
tween causing a third party to breach its contract and making it difficult
for the plaintiff to perform its own. This difference was not brought to
light in the Chantos jury issues, which did not ask if the defendants had
interfered tortiously with the plaintiff's ability to perform its own con-
tracts. But in the future, similarly-situated plaintiffs may plead, argue,
and prove tortious interference not only with existing or prospective
third-party contracts, but also with the plaintiffs' ability to perform their
own.
F. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES: ELEVATOR (COMPANY) GOING DowN
Bagby Elevator Co. v. Schindler Elevator Corp.1 30 gave new meaning to
"maximum capacity" after Schindler Elevator suffered an exemplary
damages award for hiring a competitor's dishonest employee and taking
advantage of the trade secrets he brought with him to regain lost
business.131
Schindler Elevator had contracts with commercial property owner
Younan to service most of its downtown Dallas high-rises. 132 Meanwhile,
Schindler's local competitor Bagby Elevator hired a new salesperson
named Armstrong. 133 Armstrong quickly made contacts at Younan and
convinced Younan to allow Bagby to service one of its downtown build-
ings.134 Soon after, Younan terminated its agreements with Schindler
(complaining of Schindler's poor work quality) and asked Armstrong to
quote prices for Bagby to take over that work.135 Bagby eventually se-
127. Id. at 915.
128. Id. at 914-16. The jury found a breach of fiduciary duty, which might have been
the "independently tortious or otherwise unlawful" act, but it had not been so pled and
there was no jury issue on the point.
129. Id. at 916.
130. Bagby Elevator Co. v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 609 F.3d 768, 768 (5th Cir. 2010).
131. Id. at 773.






cured five-year service contracts on eight of Younan's Dallas properties-
thanks in large part to Armstrong-but after Bagby discovered that Arm-
strong was running up personal charges on his company credit card Arm-
strong was fired.136
It did not take long for Armstrong to run back to Schindler and ask for
his job back-premised on the commitment that he would get back the
Younan contracts he had caused Schindler to lose to Bagby.137 And so he
did, first by revealing Bagby's confidential pricing terms to Schindler so it
could undercut Bagby's prices, and then by assuring Younan (with Schin-
dler) that the Bagby contracts contained a termination clause which
would allow Younan to terminate them at will.1 38 This was untrue, how-
ever, and Bagby sued Younan for breach of contract. 139 When Younan
confronted Schindler about this, Armstrong produced a "suspicious" let-
ter he claimed to have written just before his termination from Bagby
purporting to give Younan a unilateral right to terminate its contracts
with Bagby.140 Suspiciously, neither Bagby nor Younan had a copy of the
letter in their files. 141 Bagby sued Schindler for tortious interference with
its Younan contracts. 142 At trial, the jury found Schindler and Arm-
strong's conduct not only constituted tortious interference, but was mali-
cious and grossly negligent; thus, it awarded Bagby exemplary
damages. 143 The Fifth Circuit found this evidence quite sufficient.' 44
VI. FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: A TORT, BUT STILL FOUR YEARS
It is worth remembering (and worth the occasional reminder) that even
though torts ordinarily carry a statute of limitations of two years, "[t]he
limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud is four years. ' 145
B. PROOF OF LOST PROFITS
In contrast to other cases in this year's Survey in which claims for lost
profits from intentional torts failed for lack of specificity, Meaux Surface
Protection, Inc. v. Fogelman affirmed a substantial award as not being too
speculative even without the assistance of an expert damages witness. 146
The evidence included testimony from a corporate representative with
136. Id.







144. Id. at 773.
145. SJW Prop. Commerce, Inc. v. S.W. Pinnacle Props., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 121,144 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2010, pet. filed) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.004(a)(4)-(5) (West 2002); Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 278 n.33 (Tex. 2006)).
146. Meaux Surface Prot., Inc. v. Fogelman, 607 F.3d 161, 173 (5th Cir. 2010).
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personal knowledge that Meaux had lost $2.3 million after the employees
left, and compared 2007 sales figures for several major clients with budget
projections which had been prepared by one of the defendants before he
left-budget projections which the defendant agreed were reasonable
estimates. 147
Two points seemed especially significant. The defendants had urged
that other factors could have contributed to the decline in business, one
being the fact that 2006 losses had been unusually high because of hurri-
canes Katrina and Rita, and another being that the industry is quite com-
petitive anyway; but the court did not find these possibilities significant
enough to overcome the jury's finding of $1.43 million in lost profits. 1 48
Also, and significantly, the court noted that "a record of profitability,
records of past profits (with other relevant facts and circumstances) may
support a finding of lost profits" for established plaintiff-enterprises,
while "new or unestablished [plaintiff] ventures must meet more exacting
standards to prove that the profits claimed are not 'too uncertain or spec-
ulative. ' 1 49 Thus, Meaux's failure to provide (or "election not to pro-
vide," as the court viewed it) more details documenting its losses or
eliminating "every potentially contributory factor" went to the weight of
lost-profits testimony rather than its sufficiency. 150
C. CAUSATION: WHAT CAUSED THE Loss?
Meaux was a departing-employee case in the vessel hull-cleaning indus-
try. Evidently, it was uncontested (at least on appeal) that the defendants
had a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, but the defendants argued "there was
no showing that their actions had caused harm to [the plaintiff]. ' 151 The
court held, however, that "[a] jury may infer proximate cause from cir-
cumstantial evidence," 152 and in this case, there appeared to the court to
be ample circumstantial evidence on which to support that inference.1 53
The defendants had "set up [their new company] several months before
they resigned,"'1 54 "informed many of [the plaintiff's] foremen and staff
that they would form a new company" 155 and that many contracts were
going with them, actively recruited the foremen (whom the clients would
follow), and within days after their resignation, had secured work crews,
master service agreements, insurance and contracts with some of the
plaintiff's largest customers.' 56 This was substantive enough to support
the jury's finding that their actions caused substantial loss to the
147. Id. at 172.
148. Id. at 170-72.
149. Id. at 171 (citing Sw. Battery Corp. v. Owen, 115 S.W.2d 1097, 1098-99 (Tex. 1938)
and Tex. Instruments v. Teletron Energy Mgmt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. 1994)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 169.
153. Id.






Compare the actions of these defendants with those of the departing
employee/independent contractors in the 2004 Houston (First District)
Court of Appeals case Abette Trucking Co. v. Arizpe.158 They also made
plans before leaving, had key employee/independent contractors and cus-
tomers promptly follow them, and were almost immediately in full opera-
tion.1 59 However, there was testimony that they did not try to convince
workers or clients to leave and did not take any trade secrets with
them.1 60 Seen in light of Meaux, the things they did not do seems to have
an added significance.
D. REMEDIES: FORFEITURE OF CONSIDERATION PLUS DAMAGES
In what may be one of the most important cases of this reporting pe-
riod, Snodgrass and Swinnea were partners in ERI Consulting, an asbes-
tos abatement business. 16' Snodgrass agreed to buy out Swinnea's
interest, and in exchange, Swinnea agreed to continue to work for ERI
and not to compete with the business. 162 Unknown to Snodgrass, how-
ever, Swinnea had already set up a competing business under the name of
Swinnea's wife.163
After the buyout, Swinnea's revenue production for ERI dropped sig-
nificantly and the relationship between Swinnea and Snodgrass deterio-
rated. 164 Soon after, Snodgrass found out about Swinnea's relationship to
Mrs. Swinnea's new business, and he sued Swinnea for breach of fiduciary
duty among other claims.165 The trial court ordered that Swinnea must
forfeit the consideration he received for the buy-out of his interest, but
the court of appeals reversed, concluding that forfeiture was not an avail-
able remedy.' 66
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court holding that
when a partner in a business breaches his fiduciary duty by fraudulently
inducing another partner to buy out his interest, the consideration he re-
ceives for his interest in the business is subject to forfeiture as a remedy
for his breach, in addition to other damages that result from his tortious
conduct.1 67 The court analogized its holding to a fee forfeiture situation
between a principal and agent, which it had discussed in Burrow v.
Arce,168 reasoning that "[t]he remedy of forfeiture is necessary to prevent
157. Id. at 169-70.
158. Abette Trucking Co. v. Arizpe, 113 S.W.3d 503, 503 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, no pet. h.).
159. See id.
160. Id. at 512.
161. ERI Consulting Eng'rs Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 870 (Tex. 2010).
162. Id. at 870-71.
163. Id. at 871.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 872.
167. Id. at 870.
168. Id. at 873; Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 237-45 (Tex. 1999).
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such abuses of trust, regardless of proof of actual damages. ' 169 The case
was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to calculate the
award. 170
Though perhaps equitable in the circumstances of this case, it may also
be possible to extend the holding of ERI Consulting too far. It is true
that fiduciary duties are to be honored; true too, that the Texas law of fair
and unfair competition sometimes shows a marked willingness to err on
the side of over-compensating rather than under-compensating for their
abuse. But forfeiture unlinked to actual damages, for the purpose of
"preventing"-i.e., deterring-"such abuses" sounds very much like ex-
emplary or punitive damages, and not even punitive damage awards may
be entirely unbounded. So if forfeitures are to be extended beyond fees
received, further equitable principles for when, how, and how much for-
feiture is appropriate will likely need to be developed.
VII. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
A. TERRITORY: GOING WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAS NEVER GONE
BEFORE. (BUT...)
In a case it believed to be of first impression, the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals held in Cobb v. Caye Publishing Group, Inc. that a reasonable
geographical limitation of a covenant not to compete could not include
areas where the employee had never worked for the plaintiff-publisher
but where the publisher intended to distribute its magazine at some point
in the future.171
Caye Publishing published and distributed a "coupon based" magazine
called Local Life. 172 "Local" in this sense meant Johnson County imme-
diately south of Fort Worth.1 73 Cobb was an independent contractor for
Caye Publishing hired to sell advertising. 174 Their agreement had a one-
year post-termination covenant not to compete but contained no geo-
graphical limitation. 175 About a year and a half later, Cobb resigned and
opened his own magazine in Weatherford and Aledo, which are located
in Parker County immediately to the northwest. 176 Caye Publishing had
never published a magazine in Parker County and had no immediate
plans to do so, but had taken some steps in that direction such as discuss-
ing buying an existing magazine there and doing other research. 177 The
court held that extending the covenant not to compete to an area where
the defendant had not previously worked would be overbroad and unen-
169. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d at 874.
170. Id. at 882.
171. Cobb v. Caye Publ'g Grp., Inc., 322 S.W.3d 780, 784 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010,
no pet. h.).





177. Id. at 785.
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forceable, and affirmed the trial court's decision to reform the covenant
to extend only to Johnson County where Cobb had worked.'
78
On its face, this seems a reasonable resolution and an equitable balanc-
ing of the legitimate interests of former employer and employee (noting,
however, that Cobb was an independent contractor), especially because
by definition the magazines were focused on geographically-limited con-
cerns. But a significant problem lies within it. It is one thing to reform a
covenant that is overbroad as to time, scope, or geographic area, as the
statute says the court "shall." 17 9 It is another thing entirely to insert a
geographical or other limitation where one does not already exist, for
where one does not already exist, there is nothing to reform. Even the
Caye Publishing court seems to have noted that principle in a footnote,1 80
citing to its 2008 case Goodin v. Jolliff, and it might have saved itself a
significant doctrinal error had it applied the principle directly. Happily in
this case, it seems to have not mattered much to the parties because Cobb
was not evincing interest in Johnson County where his former contractor
was incumbent. 181 The concern lies for those who might rely too heavily
on this case in the future.
B. TEMPORARY INJUNCTION DENIED: LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS, BUT
No IRREPARABLE HARM
Despite the growing trend in courts implying terms to enforce noncom-
pete agreements, Sadler Clinic Association v. Hart182 highlights the diffi-
culty that employers still encounter in obtaining temporary injunctions.
A physician practice group sued a former partner in the practice for vio-
lating a noncompete agreement when he left to form a solo practice
within the twenty-two-mile proscribed radius in his agreement.' 83 The
trial court denied the practice's request for a temporary injunction. 184
The appellate court recognized that the practice may indeed be suc-
cessful at enforcing the noncompete at trial-where the employer need
not establish irreparable harm-but it refused to disturb the trial court's
denial of the temporary injunction. 185 The court emphasized that when
the twenty-two-mile geographic restriction was implemented, the town of
Conroe's population was half the size it was when the practice sought to
178. Id. at 783-84.
179. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (West 2009).
180. Caye Publ'g Grp., 322 S.W.3d at 784 n.16 (citing Goodin v. Jolliff, 257 S.W.3d
341,352 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (holding that an agreement restricting a
party from starting, directly or indirectly, a competing business "without any limitation as
to geographic scope whatsoever" was unenforceable)). See Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v.
Welch Assoc., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. 1990) (an agreement containing no limit on
geographic area or scope of activity was "an unreasonable restraint of trade and unen-
forceable on grounds of public policy").
181. See id.
182. Sadler Clinic Ass'n v. Hart, No. 09-09-00452-CV, 2010 WL 114241, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont Jan. 14, 2010, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at *3.
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enforce the agreement. 186 Also, there was no evidence that the departing
physician had taken any of the practice's confidential information or that
the practice had suffered a loss of revenue as a result of his departure. 187
The practice simply failed to prove irreparable harm, which is a prerequi-
site to obtaining a preliminary injunction.188
C. TERMINATION OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
In Drummond American, LLC v. Share Corp., the court held that in-
voluntary termination of an at-will employment agreement does not in-
validate a noncompete covenant.1 89 The court reasoned that the method
by which the at-will employment was terminated was not relevant to the
noncompete issue. 190 Two of Drummond's independent sales agents ter-
minated their employment with Drummond and went to work for Share,
Drummond's direct competitor. 91 Drummond sued the employees,
along with Share, to enforce the employees' noncompete covenant. 192 In
defense, the defendants argued the covenant was not enforceable because
Drummond's actions prior to the employees' departure give rise to a bad
faith constructive discharge.193 The court responded that the contract
was at-will, so it did not matter who terminated the contract, when, or
how. 194 It was terminable at any time by either party with or without
cause, and the noncompete covenants remained enforceable. 95
VIII. CONCLUSION
This year seems to have seen an outsize number of cases focusing on
remedies: equitable forfeitures, calculations of lost profits, assessments of
what damages can and cannot be reached, injunction durations, and other
questions of remedies. Instructive lessons can be drawn from each case,
and while no specific trend is apparent, we suggest three thoughts.
This year's cases seem generally-though without ever quite saying
so-to point toward increased focus on specific lost sales and accounts,
and toward near-individualized calculations for the resulting losses. It
may be too that breach of fiduciary duty is rising in the constellation of
business tort causes of action and that coming years will see, possibly
from the forfeiture holding of ERI Consulting, more claims on that topic.
We finally note some significant and sometimes ominous examples of
courts focusing too narrowly on particular language of past cases rather
than on the principles found in those cases, or worse, of courts laudably
186. Id. at *2.
187. Id. at *2-3.
188. Id.
189. Drummond Am., LLC v. Share Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 650, 657 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 652.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 653.
194. Id. at 657.
195. Id. at 657-58.
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focusing on the facts of the cases before them and reaching what are
probably the equitable results in those cases, but perhaps on the wrong
reasoning, or more commonly, on reasoning which is not quite right
enough. These are cautionary tales for the future.
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